The warnings, failures and inquiries around the October 7 attack

Reporting about prior warnings raised further questions. The New York Times reported that Israeli officials had obtained Hamas's attack blueprint more than a year beforehand but dismissed it as aspirational.^[6] In December 2023, Israel's military announced the discovery of what it called the largest Hamas tunnel found in Gaza, close to a border crossing, prompting scrutiny of how surveillance had missed the preparations.^[8]

The military's own accounting followed in 2025. In January, Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi announced he would resign effective March 6, accepting responsibility for failing to prevent the attack.^[2] In February, an internal army investigation acknowledged a complete failure and described intelligence gaps, flawed assumptions about Hamas and systemic weaknesses in preparedness and response.^[1]

In September 2026, Israeli media reported that the UAE had warned Netanyahu before the attack. Netanyahu denied the claim and threatened to sue the newspaper, which stood by its reporting.^[3] Reports of Egyptian and Emirati warnings fuelled criticism ahead of the Israeli election scheduled for October 27, with responsibility for October 7 central to the campaign.^[9][10]

A separate line of research examined trading before the attack. An academic study found unusually large bets against Israeli stocks and suggested some traders might have had advance knowledge. Reports described an inquiry into those allegations; the cited evidence does not establish who traded or whether they knew of Hamas's plans.^[7]